CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Africa has contributed only a small share of the greenhouse gases that drive climate change. Estimates of that share vary with the method used, from about 3–4% (Mateko & Vutula, 2024) to less than 10% (World Meteorological Organization [WMO], 2023). Yet the continent is suffering disproportionately from the effects. The WMO’s State of the Climate in Africa report, produced with the African Union Commission and the UN Economic Commission for Africa, finds that temperatures in Africa are rising faster than in the past and that weather- and climate-related hazards are becoming more severe. It links these changes to harm to food security, ecosystems and economies, to displacement and migration, and to a greater risk of conflict over scarce resources (WMO, 2023). Because Africa combines high exposure and fragility with low capacity to adapt, its people are expected to feel the effects more severely than people elsewhere (WMO, 2023).

Climate change is likely to fall hardest on the poorest and most marginalised groups, who have the least capacity to respond. It also threatens to deepen existing inequalities in health, education, food, water, sanitation and energy. Without action to reduce these effects, they can shrink the amount of usable farmland, worsen chronic hunger and feed social unrest. These direct and indirect impacts can in turn trigger migration, particularly within and between African states (Mateko & Vutula, 2024; WMO, 2023).

The scale of movement is already large. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reports that about 35 million people were living in internal displacement in Africa at the end of 2023, roughly three times the number in 2009. Conflict and violence accounted for 32.5 million of them, up from 10.2 million in 2009, and annual disaster displacements rose nearly six-fold, from 1.1 million to 6.3 million, over the same period (IDMC, 2024). The IDMC also stresses that conflict, violence and disasters often overlap, which produces repeated and prolonged displacement (IDMC, 2024). Looking ahead, the World Bank has projected that internal climate migration in sub-Saharan Africa could reach around 86 million people by 2050 (World Bank, 2022, as cited in Mateko & Vutula, 2024). Research on the climate, conflict and migration nexus argues that these dynamics need to be examined together rather than as separate problems (Watson et al., 2022, as cited in Mateko & Vutula, 2024).

The terminology is contested. Many people speak of “climate refugees”, but “refugee” has a specific legal meaning under the 1951 Refugee Convention, which is tied to a fear of persecution and does not cover environmental causes. Some scholars and policymakers argue that the definition should be widened to protect people displaced by climate change (Mateko & Vutula, 2024), while others warn that reopening the definition could lower protection for refugees in general and prefer to strengthen protection for people displaced across borders by disasters through separate arrangements (Mohamoud et al., 2014). This study uses the terms “migrants”, “displaced persons” and “refugees” carefully in light of this debate.

The African diaspora is a further, less examined, part of the picture. Diaspora communities can act as a bridge between Africa and their host countries by raising awareness, mobilising support and contributing to transnational cooperation (Mohamoud et al., 2014). They are also a source of finance and knowledge. Remittances to Africa reached nearly US$100 billion in 2022, more than official development assistance or foreign direct investment, and they may help households and communities withstand climate shocks (Mbiyozo, 2024). With adaptation costs rising and official finance declining, diaspora finance in the form of remittances, investments and knowledge transfer has been proposed as a source of new private funding for climate action in sub-Saharan Africa (Annan-Aggrey, 2025).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Governments and development actors have shown growing interest in what diaspora groups can contribute to development strategies, poverty reduction and economic growth, but it remains unclear how best to engage them (Mohamoud et al., 2014). Diasporas can supply skills and expertise to their countries of origin through return migration, including temporary or “virtual” return. Migrants also act as ambassadors in both directions, representing their homeland in the host country and the host country in their country of origin. To play this dual role well, diaspora members need to be informed about global issues that affect their countries of origin, including climate change. They can help to raise awareness in host countries, and to build public acceptance there of the assistance that is provided to vulnerable countries (Mohamoud et al., 2014).

African countries have to mobilise financial, institutional and human resources on many fronts to cope with climate change, and the diaspora could contribute to this effort. At the same time, the links between climate change, political conflict and forced movement remain poorly integrated in policy. Existing global frameworks for refugees and migrants, as well as initiatives on disaster displacement, have been found to fall short of providing the solutions that are required (Mateko & Vutula, 2024). Regional arrangements such as the African Union’s Kampala Convention for internally displaced persons exist, yet displacement continues to grow (IDMC, 2024). This study therefore evaluates climate change and political conflict in Africa, with a focus on migration and refugees, and examines the role that the African diaspora can play.

1.3 Research Objectives

The general objective of the study is to evaluate climate change and political conflict in Africa, with a focus on migration and refugees on the continent. The specific objectives are to:

1. examine the links between climate change, political conflict and displacement in Africa;
2. assess the role of the African diaspora in assisting countries of origin in their fight against the adverse impacts of climate change;
3. identify the policy processes that are relevant to address the multiple challenges that climate change triggers in different parts of Africa; and
4. define more clearly the role of the African diaspora in discussions on climate change and political conflict.

1.4 Research Questions

The following research questions guided the study:

1. What are the links between climate change, political conflict and displacement in Africa?
2. What is the role of the African diaspora in assisting countries of origin in their fight against the adverse impacts of climate change?
3. What policy processes are relevant to address the multiple challenges that climate change triggers in different parts of Africa?
4. What is the role of the African diaspora in discussions on climate change and political conflict?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study is relevant to both society and academia in three main ways.

First, it aims to stimulate debate on the connected issues of climate change, political conflict, development and migration, and so to strengthen the involvement and voice of the African diaspora. It offers insight into the scale of the environmental challenges that climate change creates in Africa now and in future, shows why they matter for development, and considers climate-related migration and displacement. The evidence on displacement shows that these questions are urgent (IDMC, 2024).

Second, the study describes the policy processes that are relevant to the many challenges that climate change creates in different parts of Africa. It can inform policy communities in both Africa and Europe on the value of treating climate change, development and migration together in global and regional frameworks, including climate negotiations, the Sustainable Development Goals, disaster-risk and displacement initiatives, and regional instruments such as the Kampala Convention (IDMC, 2024; Mateko & Vutula, 2024).

Third, the study contributes to defining more clearly the role of the African diaspora in discussions on climate change. It builds on earlier work calling for diaspora communities in Europe to be involved in climate debates, and for a cross-continental constituency that can press for policy and practical change at local, national, European Union and African Union levels (Mohamoud et al., 2014). It also draws on newer research on diaspora finance and remittances as a contribution to climate resilience (Annan-Aggrey, 2025; Mbiyozo, 2024).

References

Annan-Aggrey, E. (2025). Diaspora finance: A pathway to strengthening climate resilience in sub-Saharan Africa. African Journal of Governance and Development, 14(1.2), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.36369/2616-9045/2025/v14i1.2a1

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. (2024). Internal displacement in Africa: An overview of trends and developments (2009–2023). IDMC. https://internal-displacement.org/regional-reports/internal-displacement-in-africa

Mateko, F. M., & Vutula, N. (2024). Disaster induced displacement and durable solutions in Africa. Natural Hazards, 120, 13835–13849. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-024-06750-7

Mbiyozo, A.-N. (2024). Migrant remittances: A climate change lifeline for Africans [Policy brief]. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.org/research/policy-briefs/migrant-remittances-a-climate-change-lifeline-for-africans

Mohamoud, A., Kaloga, A., & Kreft, S. (2014). Climate change, development, and migration: An African diaspora perspective [Discussion draft]. Germanwatch. https://germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/publication/9112.pdf

World Meteorological Organization. (2023). State of the climate in Africa 2022. WMO. https://wmo.int/node/21795